# $n$-INFINITE FORCING VIA INFINITE FORCING 

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#### Abstract

We show that the $n$-infinite forcing companion of a given theory $T$ can be obtained using just infinite forcing relation.


Throughout the article $L$ is a first order finitary language. The basic logical symbols will be (as in [2], [3]) $\neg$ (negation), $\wedge$ (conjunction) and $\exists$ (existential quantifier); the others are defined via the basic ones in a standard way. It is obvious that the particular choice of the logical symbols is irrelevant.

For the notation and some (relatively new) notions we refer the reader to [3]. For his convenience we recall a few things.

As usual, if $\mathbf{A}$ is a model of the language $L$ (with domain $A$ ), then $L(A)$ is the expansion of the language $L$ obtained by adding a set of new constants $\left\{c_{a} \mid a \in A\right\}$. It is understood that the interpretation of the constant $c_{a}$ in the expansion of the model $\mathbf{A}$ to the language $L(A)$ is $a$. However, we will write $a$ instead of $c_{a}$ when the context provides that it will not cause any confusion. If a model $\mathbf{B}$ is an $n$ elementary extension of a model $\mathbf{A}$ (i.e. if $\mathbf{A}$ is an $n$-elementary submodel of $\mathbf{B}$ ) we will write $\mathbf{A} \prec_{n} \mathbf{B}$; for $n=0$ it is written $\mathbf{A} \leq \mathbf{B}$ (or sometimes $\mathbf{A}<\mathbf{B}$ when we want to emphasize that $\mathbf{A}$ is a proper submodel of $\mathbf{B}$ ) rather than $\mathbf{A} \prec_{0} \mathbf{B}$.

The only difference in definitions of infinite and $n$-infinite forcing relations is in connection with negation symbol. In general, for any $n \in \omega$ a model $\mathbf{A}$, from the given class $\mathcal{K}$ of models of a first order finitary language $L, n$-infinitely forces a sentence $\neg \varphi$ of the language $L(A)$ if and only if no $n$-elementary extension of $\mathbf{A}$ in $\mathcal{K}$ forces $\varphi$; hence, for $n=0$ we have Robinson's infinite forcing.

The theories (of a given language $L$ ), usually presented by a set of axioms, will be consistent deductively closed sets of sentences; so, for instance, for a theory $T, T \cap \Pi_{n+1}$ will not be just the set $\left\{\varphi \mid \varphi\right.$ is a $\Pi_{n+1}$-sentence and $\left.T \vdash \varphi\right\}$, but

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the set of all its consequences. By the way, by $\Pi_{n}$-formula we mean any formula equivalent to a formula in a prenex normal form whose prenex consists of $n$ blocks of quantifiers, the first one is the block of universal quantifiers ( $\Sigma_{n}$-formulas are defined analogously). In this case, in order to simplify notation, we will use the symbol $\Phi_{n}$ for the union of the sets of all $\Pi_{n}$ - and $\Sigma_{n}$-formulas, that is for the set of all formulas equivalent to formulas in a prenex normal form with at most $n$ blocks of quantifiers, and $\operatorname{SENT}\left(\Phi_{n}\right)$ for the set of $\Phi_{n}$-sentences. Clearly, $S E N T(L)$ will be the set of all sentences of the language $L$. The class of all models of a given theory $T$ will be denoted by $\mu(T)$ and the class of all $n$-infinitely generic models from the class $\mu\left(T \cap \Pi_{n+1}\right)$ by $\mathcal{L}_{T}^{n}$; for $n=0$ we simply write $\mathcal{L}_{T}$. The theory $\left\{\varphi \in \operatorname{SENT}(L) \mid \mathbf{A}=\varphi, \mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{L}_{T}^{n}\right\}$, denoted by $T^{F_{n}}$, is called the $n$-infinite forcing companion of $T$.

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In [2] it was shown that (for any positive natural number $n$ ) from a purely technical point of view we do not need $n$-finite forcing relation in obtaining $n$-finite forcing companion as well as that each theory $T$ of the language $L$ has an extension defined in the appropriate expansion of the language $L$ whose finite and $n$-finite forcing companions coincide. We apply basically the same proof pattern to obtain analogous results for infinite forcing.

Let $T$ be a theory of the language $L$ and $\|=_{n}$ an $n$-infinite forcing relation corresponding to $T$ (thus, it is a relation between the models of the class $\mu\left(T \cap \Pi_{n+1}\right)$ and the sentences defined in them). To each $\Phi_{n}$-formula $\phi\left(v_{i_{1}}, \ldots, v_{i_{m}}\right), m \geq$ 1, where $f v(\phi)=\left\{v_{i_{1}}, \ldots, v_{i_{m}}\right\}$ and the $m$-tuple $\bar{v}=\left(v_{i_{1}}, \ldots, v_{i_{m}}\right)$ is uniquely determined, for instance by a sequence of free occurrences of variables in $\phi$, we join a new $m$-ary relation symbol $R_{\phi, \bar{v}}$. Accordingly, $R_{\phi, \bar{v}}\left(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{m}\right)$ will be always a result of substituting in $R_{\phi, \bar{v}}\left(v_{i_{1}}, \ldots, v_{i_{m}}\right)$ the terms $t_{1}, \ldots, t_{m}$ for occurrences of $v_{i_{1}}, \ldots, v_{i_{m}}$, respectively. As for $\Phi_{n}$-sentences we associate each of them with the new unary relation symbol; naturaly, $R_{\psi}$ is to correspond to the sentence $\psi$. In the language $\bar{L}$, obtained by extension of the language $L$ by the set of these new relation symbols, we define $\bar{T}$ to be the set of consequences of

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\left(T \cap \Pi_{n+1}\right) \cup\left\{\forall \bar{v}\left(\phi(\bar{v}) \Leftrightarrow R_{\phi, \bar{v}}(\bar{v})\right) \mid \phi(\bar{v}) \in \Phi_{n} \backslash S E N T\left(\Phi_{n}\right)\right\} \cup \\
&\left\{\left(\psi \Leftrightarrow \forall v_{1} R_{\psi}\left(v_{1}\right)\right) \wedge\left(\forall v_{1} R_{\psi}\left(v_{1}\right) \vee \forall v_{1} \neg R_{\psi}\left(v_{1}\right)\right) \mid \psi \in \operatorname{SENT}\left(\Phi_{n}\right)\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Clearly, any model $\mathbf{A}$ of $T \cap \Pi_{n+1}$ can be expanded to a model $\overline{\mathbf{A}}$ of $\bar{T}$ by putting $\left(\right.$ for $\left.\phi(\bar{v}) \in \Phi_{n} \backslash S E N T\left(\Phi_{n}\right)\right)\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right) \in R_{\phi, \bar{v}}^{\overline{\mathbf{A}}}$ iff $\mathbf{A}=\phi\left[a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right]$ and (for $\left.\psi \in S E N T\left(\Phi_{n}\right)\right) R_{\psi}^{\overline{\mathbf{A}}}=A$ if $\mathbf{A}=\psi$, otherwise $R_{\psi}^{\overline{\mathbf{A}}}=\emptyset$.

Let us note that as for propositions bellow nothing would be changed if we included the whole theory $T$ in the definition of $\bar{T}$ instead of just its $\Pi_{n+1}$-segment.

Let $\|=$ be Robinson's infinite forcing relation corresponding to $\bar{T}$. The following holds

Lemma 2.1. If $\mathbf{A}$ is a model of $T \cap \Pi_{n+1}, \overline{\mathbf{A}}$ its expansion to a model of $\bar{T}$ and $\phi\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right)$ the sentence of the language $L(A)$, then $\mathbf{A} \|={ }_{n} \phi\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right)$ iff $\overline{\mathbf{A}} \|=\phi\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right)$.

Proof. We will denote the models of the language $L$ by $\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \ldots$ and the models of the language $\bar{L}$ by $\overline{\mathbf{A}}, \overline{\mathbf{B}}, \ldots$.

We prove the assertion of the lemma by induction on the complexity of the formula $\phi$ (and for all pairs of models of the theory $T \cap \Pi_{n+1}$ and their expansions to the models of the theory $\bar{T})$. The case of atomic formulas is trivial and as for induction steps only the case $\phi\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right) \equiv \neg \psi\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right)$ is of some interest. Let us suppose that $\mathbf{A} n$-infinitely forces $\neg \psi\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right)$ (with respect to the class $\mu\left(T \cap \Pi_{n+1}\right)$ ) while $\overline{\mathbf{A}}$ does not infinitely force the same formula (with respect to the class $\left.\mu\left(\bar{T} \cap \Pi_{1}\right)\right)$. Since the class of models of the theory $\bar{T}$ is mutually consistent with the class $\mu\left(\bar{T} \cap \Pi_{1}\right)$, there exists a model $\overline{\mathbf{B}}$ of $\bar{T}$ which is an extension of the model $\overline{\mathbf{A}}$ and which infinitely forces $\psi\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right)$. By inductive hypothesis the reduct $\mathbf{B}$ of $\overline{\mathbf{B}}$ to the language $L n$-infinitely forces $\psi\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right)$ and we obtain a contradiction for $\mathbf{B}$ is an $n$-elementary extension of the model $\mathbf{A}$. Really, if $\varphi(\bar{v}) \equiv \varphi\left(v_{i_{1}}, \ldots, v_{i_{k}}\right)$ is a $\Phi_{n}$-formula (with some free variables), then we have for all $k$-tuples $\left(a_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, a_{k}^{\prime}\right)$ of the elements from $A$ : $\mathbf{A} \models \varphi\left[a_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, a_{k}^{\prime}\right]$ iff $\left(a_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, a_{k}^{\prime}\right) \in R_{\varphi, \bar{v}}^{\overline{\mathbf{A}}}$ iff $\left(a_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, a_{k}^{\prime}\right) \in R_{\varphi, \bar{v}}^{\overline{\mathbf{B}}}$ iff $\mathbf{B} \models \varphi\left[a_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, a_{k}^{\prime}\right]$; if $\theta$ is a $\Phi_{n^{-}}$ sentence of the language $L$, then from $\mathbf{A} \models \theta$ follows subsequently $\overline{\mathbf{A}} \models \forall v_{1} R_{\theta}\left(v_{1}\right)$, $\overline{\mathbf{B}}=\forall v_{1} R_{\theta}\left(v_{1}\right)\left(\right.$ for $\forall v_{1} R_{\theta}\left(v_{1}\right) \vee \forall v_{1} \neg R_{\theta}\left(v_{1}\right)$ is a sentence of the theory $\left.\bar{T}\right), \mathbf{B} \mid=\theta$.

The proof of the implication $\bar{A}\left\|=\neg \psi\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right) \Rightarrow A\right\|{ }_{n} \neg \psi\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right)$ is similar.

Lemma 2.2. If $\mathbf{A}$ is a model of $T \cap \Pi_{n+1}, \overline{\mathbf{A}}$ its expansion to a model of $\bar{T}$, then $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{L}_{T}^{n}$ iff $\overline{\mathbf{A}} \in \mathcal{L}_{\bar{T}}$.

Proof. Both implications follow from the previous lemma. However, the case of the implication $(\Rightarrow)$ is a little bit less obvious. So let $\mathbf{A}$ be $n$-infinitely generic model (for the theory $T$ ). We show by induction on the complexity of the formulas (of the language $\bar{L}$ ) that for any formula $\phi\left(v_{i_{1}}, \ldots, v_{i_{m}}\right)(\phi(\bar{v})$ for short), $m \geq 0$, and all $m$-tuples $\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right)$ of the elements from $A$ the following holds: $\overline{\overline{\mathbf{A}}}=$ $\phi\left[a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right]$ iff $\overline{\mathbf{A}} \|=\phi\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m}\right)$. Again, only the step $\phi(\bar{v}) \equiv \neg \psi(\bar{v})$ requires a word of explanation. It is obvious that $\overline{\mathbf{A}} \|=\phi(\bar{a})$ implies $\overline{\mathbf{A}}=\phi[\bar{a}]$. Thus let $\overline{\mathbf{A}} \models \neg \psi[\bar{a}]$ and let us suppose that $\overline{\mathbf{A}}$ does not infinitely force $\neg \psi(\bar{a})$. Of course, $\psi(\bar{v})$ is not a formula of the language $L$. Let $\chi(\bar{v})$ be a formula of the language $L$ obtained from the formula $\neg \psi$ by substituting for the relation symbols $R_{\varphi, \bar{u}}$ and $R_{\theta}$ the corresponding formulas $\varphi(\bar{u})$ and sentences $\theta$; let us note (and in part repeat the facts) that (for a sentence $\theta$ of the language $L$ ) the sentences $\forall v R_{\theta}(v) \Leftrightarrow \exists v R_{\theta}(v)$ and $\forall v\left(R_{\theta}(v) \Leftrightarrow \theta\right)$ are the theorems of the theory $\bar{T}$. Clearly, $\bar{T} \vdash \neg \psi(\bar{v}) \Leftrightarrow \chi(\bar{v})$, thus $\overline{\mathbf{A}} \models \chi[\bar{a}]$, that is $\mathbf{A} \models \chi[\bar{a}]$. Since $\mathbf{A}$ is an $n$-infinitely generic model it follows that $\mathbf{A} \| \models_{n} \chi(\bar{a})$, whence (by the previous lemma) $\overline{\mathbf{A}} \|=\chi(\bar{a})$. Let $\overline{\mathbf{A}}_{1}$ be an infinitely generic model (of the theory $\bar{T}$ ) which is an extension of the model $\overline{\mathbf{A}}$ and which infinitely forces $\psi(\bar{a})$ (of course, $\overline{\mathbf{A}}_{1}$ infinitely forces $\chi[\bar{a}]$ as well). In the
sequel we construct a chain of models $\overline{\mathbf{A}}=\overline{\mathbf{A}}_{0} \leq \overline{\mathbf{A}}_{1} \leq \cdots \leq \overline{\mathbf{A}}_{2 k} \leq \overline{\mathbf{A}}_{2 k+1} \leq \cdots$, where $\overline{\mathbf{A}}_{2 k}, k=0,1,2, \ldots$, are models of the theory $\bar{T}$ while $\overline{\mathbf{A}}_{2 k+1}, k=0,1,2, \ldots$, are infinitely generic models (of the same theory). It is known that the (sub)chain $\overline{\mathbf{A}}_{1} \leq \overline{\mathbf{A}}_{3} \leq \cdots \leq \overline{\mathbf{A}}_{2 k+1} \leq \cdots$ is an elementary chain as well as that its union $\overline{\mathbf{B}}$ is an infinitely generic model too. Whence $\overline{\mathbf{B}}=\psi[\bar{a}] \wedge \chi[\bar{a}]$. On the other hand, $\overline{\mathbf{B}}=\bigcup_{k=0}^{\infty} \overline{\mathbf{A}}_{2 k}$ is also a model of the theory $\bar{T}$. This is a consequence of the fact (proved in the previous lemma) that the chain $\mathbf{A}_{0} \leq \mathbf{A}_{2} \leqq \cdots \leq \mathbf{A}_{2 k} \leq \cdots$ is an $n$-elementary chain; thus $\mathbf{B}$ (the restriction of the model $\overline{\mathbf{B}}$ to the language $L$ ) is an $n$-elementary extension of each model $\mathbf{A}_{2 k}$ and satisfies the theory $T \cap \Pi_{n+1}$. But this gives $\overline{\mathbf{B}}=\neg \psi(\bar{a}) \Leftrightarrow \chi(\bar{a})$, in contradiction to the satisfiability of $\psi(\bar{a})$ and $\chi(\bar{a})$ in $\overline{\mathbf{B}}$. We conclude that $\overline{\mathbf{A}}$ infinitely forces $\neg \psi(\bar{a})$.

Corollary 2.3. (1) The class of infinitely generic models of the theory $\bar{T}$ is the class of expansions of the $n$-infinitely generic models of the theory $T$ to the models of the theory $\bar{T}$;
(2) If $\bar{T}^{F}$ is the infinite forcing companion of the theory $\bar{T}$, then

$$
T^{F_{n}}=\bar{T}^{F} \cap S E N T(L)
$$

Proof. (1) We have just showed that the union of the chain of models of the theory $\bar{T}$ is again a model of $\bar{T}$. Thus $\bar{T}$ is $\Pi_{2}$-axiomatizable, whence $\mathcal{L}_{\bar{T}}$ is a subclass of the class $\mu(\bar{T})$ (it is known that, in general, $\bar{T} \cap \Pi_{2} \subseteq \bar{T}^{F}$ ).

Let $T$ be a theory of the language $L$ and let us define recursively (and simultaneously) the sequences of languages $L_{k}$ and theories $T_{k}, k \in \omega$, in the following way:

$$
\begin{array}{cl}
L_{0}=L, & T_{0}=T \\
L_{k+1}=\overline{L_{k}}, & T_{k+1}=\overline{T_{k}}
\end{array}
$$

It is assumed that the language $L_{k+1}$ and the theory $T_{k+1}$ are formed by extensions of $L_{k}$ and $T_{k}$, respectively, in a way analogous to obtaining $\bar{L}$ and $\bar{T}$ (in the first lemma) from $L$ and $T$.

The following theorem holds for the theory $T_{\omega} \stackrel{\text { def }}{=} \bigcup_{k \in \omega} T_{k}$ defined in the language $L_{\omega} \stackrel{\text { def }}{=} \bigcup_{k \in \omega} L_{k}$

THEOREM 2.4. (1) If $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{B}$ are models of the theory $T_{\omega}$, then from $\mathbf{A} \leq \mathbf{B}$ follows $\mathbf{A} \prec_{n} \mathbf{B} ; \quad$ (2) $\mathcal{L}_{T_{\omega}}=\mathcal{L}_{T_{\omega}}^{n} ; \quad$ (3) $T_{\omega}^{F}=T_{\omega}^{F_{n}}$;

Proof. (1) Let $\mathbf{A}$ be a submodel of $\mathbf{B}$. If $\phi(\bar{a})$ is a $\Phi_{n}$-sentence (of the language $\left.L_{\omega}(A)\right)$ which is true in $\mathbf{A}$ and $k$ the least natural number such that $\phi(\bar{v})$ is a formula of the language $L_{k}$, then for the relation symbol $R_{\phi, \bar{v}}$ of the language $L_{k+1}$ we have $\mathbf{A} \models R_{\phi, \bar{v}}[\bar{a}]$. Thus $\mathbf{B} \vDash R_{\phi, \bar{v}}[\bar{a}]$, but we have also $\mathbf{B} \vDash\left(R_{\phi, \bar{v}} \Leftrightarrow \phi\right)[\bar{a}]$, whence $\mathbf{B}=\phi[\bar{a}]$.
(2) Clearly, because of (1) the infinite and $n$-infinite forcing relations coincide in the case of the class $\mu\left(T_{\omega}\right)$.

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